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Introd u ction
In recent years scientists and a broader public have become increasingly aware of global environmental problems like the greenhouse effect (Nordhaus 1991) , deforest ation, the loss of bio-diversity, and the destruction of the ozone layer by emissions of CFC. These effects are the most prominent examples of a class of environmental problems in which only aggregate global emissions or the aggregate activity level are important for determining the damage caused. The damage is non-exclusive and non-rival, and independent of how aggregate emissions are shared among regions or countries. For instance, the radiation protection that is provided by an undamaged ozone layer is a pure public good. Its deterioration hurts globally, and nobody is excluded from a reduction of its quality. Carraro and Siniscalco (1991) point out that this public good property of many global environmental phenomena, combined with the absence of supra-national regulatory government, results in a potential for resource misallocation, and this makes the problem a focus in recent environmental economics. For global problems like the destruction of the ozone layer, countries can be considered to be the relevant economic agents, and their regulatory policy options are their decision variables. Ploeg and Zeeuw (1992) and Hoel (1992a) , for instance, concentrate on the intertemporal stock-flow properties of a private provision game for emission reduction. Hoel (1991a Hoel ( , 1991b Hoel ( , 1992b analyses questions of different measures of international cooperation. Frankhauser and Kverndokk (1992) calculate expected effects of different cooperation regimes. Hoel (1991a) shows that a country's benevolent unilateral voluntary emission reduction commitment that precedes an environmental convention in which aggregate emission reductions are collectively decided may increase total emissions compared to a situation where all countries act selfishly. This paper is related to Hoel (1991a) from a structural point of view. It, too, is concerned with actions that are taken before a non-cooperative or cooperative game of emission reduction in a multi-country model takes place, where the sum of emissions is a public good for all countries. Countries first choose their emission reduction technology. When choosing its production technology, a country can decide to apply a technology for which emission reduction is more or less expensive. For instance, when fixed capital is built up by investing in a particular technology, the cost of future emission reduction is irreversibly determined, but not necessarily the quantity of reductions.
When some technological commitments are already made, representatives of countries come together in environmental conventions and bargain on emission reductions. They may reach a cooperative agreement. Otherwise they play a non-cooperative game of voluntary emission reduction. It turns out that the technology decision of a. country is of strategic importance for the amount of its emission reduction in the non-cooperative as well as in the cooperative equilibrium.
For illustration, suppose that a country chooses between two types of power plants, one with wide pipes that allow for the installation of emission reduction devices at low extra cost, and one with narrow pipes, where the later introduction of an emission reduction device requires the existing pipes to be replaced by appropriately wide ones. Suppose that, in the absence of emission reduction devices, both types of plants are equally expensive. One might naturally assume that a country would prefer to install the plant with the wide pipes, so as not to incur high costs of emission reduction, regardless of whether its own reductions are determined in a non-cooperative or cooperative emission reduction game in the future. Not so.
In many circumstances the country will choose the plant with the narrow pipes and high later emission reduction costs. The reason is that, by choosing the technology with high marginal costs of emission reduction, the country can shift some of the burden of emission reduction to other countries. In the non-cooperative solution, higher costs of emission reduction in a country make it more credible for it to be a free rider in a non-cooperative Nash game. In the cooperative solution, the country with high emission reduction costs has an advantage because its technology choice changes the non-cooperative solution, and the non-cooperative solution is the "disagreement point" in the bargaining game.
The problem is studied in a two-stage setting. At stage 1 countries choose their technology; they make irreversible investments that determine their future unit costs of emission reduction. At stage *2 countries play non-cooperatively or cooperatively. If they play non-cooperatively, emission reduction of each country is like voluntary provision of a public good. The standard model of private provision of a public good (e.g., Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 1986) will be adequate to describe the stage-2 equilibrium outcome. Alternatively, they may agree on a cooperative Nash bargaining solution with side payments. In any case, the choice of emission reduction technology will determine each country's utility in the stage-2 equilibrium; and this will make them choose strategically in stage-1.
V olun tary em ission reductions
Consider countries i = l,...n. Each country has utility
where yi is the amount of an universal good consumed in country i, and G = Ei gi are aggregate reductions of environmentally harmful emissions, with gi > 0 the emission reduction in country i. This supposes that, without emission reduction, the emission level of country i is exogenously given to be some Ei > 0, and actual emissions of a country are Ei -gi. with Amin > 0.
Note that this implies that a country incurs no extra cost for choosing a technology with lower unit costs of emission reduction. This assumption could be replaced by assuming that a technology with lower unit costs of emission reduction has different installation costs. The cost associated with installing a particular reduction technology would enter like set up costs and would be sunk in the stage-2 game when only emission reduction quantities are determined. If set up costs were different for technologies with different unit costs of emission reduction, this model complication would not offset the basic incentive mechanism that is derived in this paper, but would distract attention from it. What makes the result in this paper surprising is that the strategic incentive to choose an expensive technology occurs despite the assumption that the technology with lower cost of emission reduction is available at no extra cost.
The technology choice occurs before the production and emission reduction activity. Therefore, the following two games with two stages are considered: In both games, the non-cooperative stage-2 Nash game of choosing (gi,...,gn) for given technology choices of others plays a crucial role. This goes without saying for the non-cooperative game. In the cooperative game, the stage-2 non-cooperative equilibrium influences the cooperative outcome because it describes the point of disagreement.
This section describes the non-cooperative Nash game at stage 2. The choices of Ai for i = l,...n are given at stage 2. The decision problem of country i, which optimizes its choice of gi for given Ai under the Nash conjecture that its emission reduction choice gi does not affect the emission reductions of others, can be described as follows. It maximizes (1) by its choice of gi, subject to its budget constraint (2) and the non-negativity constraints gi > 0 and yi > 0. Emission reductions and consumption of the universal good cannot be negative. As is standard in the literature on private provision of a public good (see, e.g., Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 1986), this problem can be recast as a problem of choosing G, the aggregate emission reduction as to Inequalities (5) and (6) express the requirement that a country's emission reductions the reduction of emissions by all others. Inequality (4) is the new budget constraint that says that i's imputed expenditure (left hand side) is not larger than its imputed income and (4) follows from (2) by adding AiG-i to both sides. By its choice of gi, country i implicitly chooses G; it considers its emission reductions as the marginal emission reductions, because it takes the reductions of all others as given.
A Nash equilibrium can be defined as a vector (gi*,...gn*) for given (Ai,...An)
such that G* = E ig i* solves the maximization problem (3) for i for given
The paper makes the following normality assumption. There is a single-valued demand function for the public good, U(u) [i = l,...n] which is the solution of (3) subject to (4), but ignoring the inequality constraints (5) and (6). This demand function is a differentiable function of imputed income u given by the right hand side of (4). The marginal propensity to reduce emissions is greater than zero and smaller than 1/Ai for i = l,...n: both private and public good are strictly normal goods. Under this condition the voluntary provision game has nice properties:
The Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists and is unique. gi = G -G-i and that consumption should be non-negative. Here, G-i = gi is
The proof of Proposition 1 is straightforward and follows precisely the lines of arguments in Bergstrom et al. (1986) . The paper concentrates on a symmetric and interior equilibrium with A = Ai = A2 -... = An. By (3) and (4), it has the property that, for all i = l,...n, Given the assumptions about u, this implies that for n > 2 the reduction of emissions in a private provision game with Nash conjectures is too small compared to a welfare optimum.
The optimal amount and the Nash equilibrium amount of aggregate emission reduction depend on the choice of emission reduction technology. The next step in the analysis is to consider the incentives countries have in choosing their emission reduction technology, knowing that there will be a private provision game in the or, using the stage-2 Nash equilibrium condition (7), (16) gl < Amin dA . I
'min
The left-hand side is the marginal additional cost of increasing Ai. The country pays higher emission reduction costs on all units of emission reduction in the stage-2 equilibrium. The right-hand side is the benefit of a commitment to higher unit cost; By (10) and (11) Equation (17) is only a necessary condition for an interior symmetric perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. In general, (17) may be fulfilled for several A*: the J/"1 equilibrium quantity gi* of reductions is decreasing in A*; however, may decrease or increase in A *. A sufficient condition for (17) to characterize a perfect symmetric equilibrium would be to require that, for Ai = ... = Ai.j = Ai,i = .
.. An = A *, u* is concave in Ai on the interval [Amin,Amax] . In general, particularly if
Amin is sufficiently small compared to A *, a country may find it attractive to give in and to choose Amin. In this case a pure-strategy equilibrium may not exist. But even in this case the equilibrium is not one in which all countries choose Amin with probability one, but A is strategically chosen too high from an efficiency perspective.
C ooperative solu tion s
Suppose now that countries know that at stage 2 they will meet at some environmental convention and bargain about emission reductions. The paper considers Nash bargaining with side payments. To apply standard Nash bargaining concepts, and to avoid considerations of coalition formation between some countries, the number of countries is restricted to n = 2.
The choice of unit costs of emission reduction affects the outcome of the bargaining game in two ways. First, it affects the utility possibility frontier as shown in Figure 1 .
Figure 1
In a Nash bargaining game with side payments, the outcome is Pareto efficient, and, therefore, characterized as follows. For given emission reduction costs (say, Ai > A2), all emission reduction will be provided by the country with lower cost of emission reduction (for instance, country 2). If both countries have the same marginal cost of emission reduction, they may split aggregate emission reductions between them. The countries agree on emission reductions gi + g 2 = G° and side payments s° such that G° solves the problem of maximizing (19) u 1 -u^m -s°,G°) > 0 A for some value of u 1. The set of Pareto efficient combinations (u^u2) for given Ai and A2 is depicted in Figure 1 as u^u 1 ). An increase of min{Ai,A2} implies that, for the same quantity of G provided, the amount of the universal good that can be distributed between the two countries is smaller. Therefore, an increase of min{Ai,A2} shifts the utility possibility frontier u2(u1) inside.
Further, as seen in the previous section, the choice of emission reduction costs affects the outcome of the non-cooperative stage-2 game. This outcome is not the equilibrium in the cooperative game, but it affects the cooperative outcome because it is the disagreement point in the Nash bargaining game. Given these two channels, it appears likely that the choice of cost of emission reduction is made strategically.
P rop osition 4
Suppose that the utility possibility frontier U2(ui) is convex for given (Ai,A2),
and (15) is fulfilled for Ai = A2 = Amin. Then countries have an incentive to choose an inefficiently high A > Amin in the cooperative game.
Proof. Suppose that country 2 chooses A2 = Amin. The utility possibility frontier u2(ui) does not depend on country l 's choice of Aj > A2; the optimal amount of emission reduction can be carried out by using country 2's technology. This possibility frontier is drawn in Figure 2 . The point A is the disagreement point if country 1 also chooses Ai = Amin. Section 3 showed that country 1 can influence the non-cooperative equilibrium outcome. If (15) is fulfilled, then, by an increase of Ai, country 1 can increase its utility in the non-coopaertive outcome; moreover, by (9), in this non-cooperative outcome country l 's emission reduction becomes smaller.
Given that country 2 chooses Amin, country 1 has an incentive to choose strategically a higher cost of emission reduction. B 
C onclusions
Decisions on the quantity of emission reduction and on the technology chosen often do not occur simultaneously. Often a basic decision for a particular type of technology is made, and later emission standards are set and appropriate emission reduction devices are installed. A country can influence the technological decision and can also regulate emissions by the different instruments that are well discussed in the literature on environmental economics. If environmentally harmful emissions lead to damage that is a public good, interaction between countries has to be considered.
Countries choose their quantities of emission reduction, either cooperatively or non-cooperatively. This paper reveals a mechanism that has more applications in other fields of economics. In the international context there are numerous public goods. Some of them are artificially created by the political structure. Examples within the European Community are the reduction of agricultural excess production, development aid to underdeveloped countries, the reduction of subsidies and reduction of national protection of declining industries, or abstinence from arms export. In some of these cases the aggregate quantity of the particular public good is determined non-cooperatively, in some other cases by cooperative agreements.
But often countries can make binding commitments that allow them to shift a larger share of the burden of provison of the public good to other countries. As this paper shows, cooperation in a later stage does not necessarily reduce such commitment incentives. The opposite may be the case. 
